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Abstract  
 
Involving effects of media, opinion leader and other agents on the opinion of individuals of 
market society, a trader based model is developed and utilized to simulate price via supply 
and demand. Pronounced effects are considered with several weights and some personal 
differences between traders are taken into account. Resulting time series and probabilty 
distribution function involving a power law for price come out similar to the real ones. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Members of market society are well known to act fundamentally according to their opinion 
[1] about to buy, to sell, and to wait, rather than real economic criteria. Opinions effect others 
and are effected by them and by other agents such as, media and opinion leaders, during their 
evolution through people, which are modeled as being cited on a square matrix. One of these 
approaches is known as the Sznajd model[2]. (Relevant issues may be found in [3]). It was 
amply used in attempts to predict votings. (See [4-11] for ‘voting model’, and see [11-15] for 
applications in some surface effects, such as catalytical reactions in material science. And, for 
economy and market related issues of opinion dynamics, see [15-17], and references therein.) 
   In the following section we apply opinion dynamics to market, and in the next one we 
display our simulation results. Last section is devoted to conclusion. 
 
 
 
2. Opinion Dynamics for Market Society  
 
The present society is composed of ten thousand people, each willing to gain money. Yet, this 
characteristics does not unify but splits them into three categories as the  buyers (demanders, 
bulls), the sellers (suppliers, bears), and the waiters (wolfs). Each of them seeks for the 
opinion of the others, since the market is made anonymously; but each may react to the 
gathered (surrounding) opinion in different manners. For example, in many cases buying of 
others (demand) prompts selling (supply) of an individual, and vice versa. And from time to 
time herding mechanism works. Market customers are not like the referees of a beauty contest 
and atoms of a crystal. In the present approach, a random individuality is assigned to each 
member, as a basic difference with respect to the previous applications of opinion dynamics to 
different societies. Secondly, for each entry of the matrix, the four nearest neighbors are 
separated from the next nearest neighbors in the strength of bonds inbetween. Because, the 
ability of one member to convince any other one may change from person to person. On the 
other hand, market people do not always believe to what they hear. Moreover, they may even 
do the opposite of what they are adviced to do. And indeed, there exist many people within 
exchange who prefer to buy (strategically) while the others are selling (i.e., during 
recessions), and vice versa. 
   Individual opinions are initially let randomly to be either -1 (sell), or +1 (buy) or 0 (wait), 
i.e. each by 33.33% but which habitant has what opinion is selected randomly in the present 
approach. So, initial demand equals to the supply. As interaction tours take place, in a manner 
described in [2-4, and 16], the range of opinion effection extends. After few runs, a 
considerable number of the 100x100 matrix inhabitants become effected by a considerable 
number of co-matricians. Accordingly, excess occurs within the numbers of transactions 
demanded and supplied, which creates an impact on the price. For example, if for a given 
price level, the number of demanded transactions becomes greater than the supplied (booked) 
amount, price increases. Because, the present booked ones will be bought and the excess 
amout (equals to demand minus supply) have to be bought from the level which is one step 
higher in price, and vice versa. It is well known that, price of shares change in discreate 
amounts (steps) in real markets. Some portion of money composing the volume is spent to 
increase the number of transactions processed with a fixed price, and the other portion is spent 
to change the price. (See [18 and 19] and references therein.) 
   Negotiators looking for a compromise, usually follow advices of their broker or some  
commentator; for example, an experienced and skillful friend or relative. Such an opinion 
leader (market guru), is cited with fixed coordinates in the bulk, i.e., far from the borders of 
the society matrix. (See, references in [3].) The effect of the opinion leader is kept constant 
throughout the tours, which may be varied in other tours. Mass media, trying to influence 
opinions through advertising may also be handled in a similar manner, with its effect covering 
the whole inhabitants at any given time. It was found [20] that, “The larger the lattice is the 
smaller is the amount of advertising needed to conceive the whole market.” 
   Each market morning, people come to market with three possible opinions in their mind; to 
buy, to sell, or to wait (watch). And accordingly, they process or wait. In the present model, 
we take 33.33% of the society as buyers (with opinion equals to +1), and 33.33% of the 
society as sellers (with opinion equals to –1), and the rest (33.33%) as waiters initially. As 
time goes on, their opinions may change during the interaction tours. And in coming tours, 
following the evolution process described in [2-4, and 16], some may become new buyers, 
some may become new sellers, and some may become new waiters. 
 
 
 
3. Market Simulations 
 
To sharpen the notation followed here: We call a collection of few runs (say, 4 in number) ‘a 
day’, and at the beginning of each new day we set the whole society to its initial values, i.e. 
the opinions to be either -1, or +1, or 0, as described in the previous section. The rest of the 
parameters are all kept as the same, except the leader or media effect, if any is being studied. 
   We figured out that, the leader or media effect become important in medium run, and any 
may not be regarded within our days comprising 4 tours. Figure 1 exemplifies an evolution of 
a leader (cited at the center) effect (with relative strength equals 0.8, white in colour in Fig.1. 
a) through the society. Within the first 5 tours (Fig.1. b), the leader effect spreads over her 
neighbors and simultaneously many other members become induced to have opinions ranging 
between 0.75 and 1, due to natural interactions. And at the end (after the next 5 tours) the 
pronounced effect becomes completely intracable (Fig.1. c), as can be compared with the 
natural distribution after 10 tours (Fig.1. d). According to the present result, one needs more 
than one agent to speculate on the market. And, short-cut is the mass media, where we obtain 
the price growing exponentially in tours (not shown), even with small values of relative 
strength of influence. 
   In a scientific society there may not exist any antithetical member, yet in exchanges there 
exist many, especially within dealers and medium-big portfolio owners. Moreover, anybody 
may react oppositely from time to time. (Also, the whole amount of sellings are bought (or, 
vice versa) during herding.) We count all these to be one part in five (20%) upmost, in our 
market simulations. Figure 2 displays a 500 day (and 4 runs per day) result of a free 
interaction of opinions, i.e., without any guru and media effects. There, we utilized the 
threshold values of +0.95 and –0.95 for bullish and bearish processes, respectively. (See, Eq. 
(4) and the relevant text in [21] for details.) Please notify that, the number of transactions per 
trader processed at any price level is irrelevant here. 
   The reader may regard that, the shape of our simulated price chart (Fig.2. a.) is very similar 
to real ones, where columns below represent excess in transactions. Probability distribution 
function for fluctuations in price is diplayed in Fig.2. b., where we have a power law. The 
extraordinary tail in Fig.2. b is due to setting the society to our standard initials, each 
‘morning’, when very stiff rises and falls may take place. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We run many more simulations with different parameters, and obtained very similar results. It 
is clear that, empirical values of coordination and strength of bonds, as well as the percentage 
of antithetical people in the given society are needed for better utilization of the presented 
results. 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
 
Figure 1. An evolution of a leader effect (with relative strength equals 0.8) through the 
society. a- At the beginning of a day. b- After 5 tours. c- After 10 tours. d- After 10 tours, 
when no leader exist, i.e., with the relative strength equals zero. 
 
Figure 2. a- 500 day (with 4 runs per day) result for price (X, with arbitrary unit) of a 
free interaction of opinions, i.e., without any guru and media effects. There, we utilized the 
threshold values of +0.95 and –0.95 for bullish and bearish processes, respectively. Below is 
the excess in number of transactions. b- Power law in price fluctuations.  
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Fig.1. a. 
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Fig. 1. b. 
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Fig. 1. c. 
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Fig.1. d 
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Fig. 2. b 
